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Abstract 
The study investigates adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression 
by expanding research with children on the happy-victimizer phenomenon. In a sample of 200 
German adolescents from Grades 7, 9, 11, and 13 (M = 16.18 years, SD = 2.41), participants were 
confronted with various scenarios describing different moral rule violations and asked to judge the 
behavior from a moral point of view. Subsequently, participants' strength of self-evaluative 
emotional reactions was assessed as they were asked to imagine that they had committed the moral 
transgression by themselves. Results indicate that the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions 
predicted adolescents' self-reported delinquent behavior even when social desirability response bias 
was controlled. Further, as adolescents' metacognitive understanding of moral beliefs developed, 
self-attributed moral emotions and confidence in moral judgment became more closely associated. 
No general age-related change in adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions was found. Overall, 
the study provides evidence for a coordination process of moral judgment and moral emotion 
attributions that continues well beyond childhood and that corresponds with the more general 
notion of the formation of a moral self in adolescence. 
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Adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression: 
relations with delinquency, confidence in moral judgment, and age 
Previous research has provided ample evidence that children acquire an understanding of 
moral rules that is intrinsically motivating quite early in development. Three- to four-year-olds 
consider particular behaviors as immoral and are motivated to abstain from such behaviors not 
because of authoritative commands or the threat of punishment (as Kohlberg's theory suggested), 
but because of the harm that is done to the victim (see e.g. Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1998; Nucci, 
2001). This intrinsic understanding of moral rules is fairly robust over the course of development. It 
becomes increasingly coordinated with other domains of social knowledge (Smetana, 1995) and 
integrated into more general developmental systems. Owing to this process of coordination and 
integration, moral development is not restricted to early childhood but continues well into 
adolescence and adulthood. As indicated by an increased consistency of judgment and action that is 
associated with more mature types and levels of moral reasoning (cf. Kohlberg & Candee, 1984; 
Gibbs et al. 1986), additional motivational sources for moral action are formed in the course of 
development. Damon (1996) and Blasi (1993, 1995) suggested that this increased consistency of 
moral judgment and action results from the development of a moral self. According to this view, 
moral reasoning and self-understanding are two independent developmental systems that become 
gradually integrated in the course of development. Owing to this integrating process moral beliefs 
cease to occupy a status external to the self and become an integral part of an individual's self-
definition (for an extensive discussion of the notion of an integration of self and morality, see 
Bergman, 2002). 
Damon (1996) argued that adolescence is critical for the formation of a moral self. 
However, the development of moral motivation is not limited to the adolescent years, as indicated, 
for instance, by research on the so called "happy-victimizer phenomenon". This line of research 
demonstrated that young children, despite of their intrinsic understanding of moral rules, tend to 
attribute positive emotions to a wrongdoer who commits an immoral act in order to achieve a 
desired goal. Moral emotion attributions as assessed by the happy-victimizer research paradigm 
turned out to be associated with children's actual behavior in various experimental as well as natural 
settings (Asendorpf & Nunner-Winkler, 1992; Nunner-Winkler, 1999). Children who attribute 
positive emotions to a moral wrongdoer evidenced more egoistic and more aggressive behavior 
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(Hughes & Dunn, 2000; Malti, 2003). Happy victimizer attributions generally decline over the 
course of development. Thus, with development, children's understanding of moral rules, on the 
one hand, and their understanding of moral emotions as experienced by an actor committing an 
immoral action, on the other, becomes increasingly coordinated. This coordination process fosters 
children's motivation to act in accordance with what they consider right from a moral point of view 
(see also Nunner-Winkler & Sodian, 1988; Harris, 1989). 
Although there is some disagreement about the precise nature of developmental change in 
children's emotion attributions and its exact relation to age (cf. Yuill, Perner, Pearson, Peerbhoy, & 
van den Emde, 1996; Keller, Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003), the finding that younger children 
tend to attribute positive emotions to a wrongdoer in spite of knowing that an act is morally wrong 
was replicated many times (e.g. Arsenio & Kramer, 1992; Lourenço, 1997, Murgatroyd & 
Robinson, 1993; 1997; Wiersma & Laupa, 2000). However, while focusing on children's 
development, the question of developmental change in emotion attributions occurring after 
childhood, i.e. in adolescence, has been largely neglected so far. If emotion attributions as assessed 
by the happy-victimizer research paradigm are related to individuals' moral motivation and if 
adolescent development is characterized by a further integration of self and morality that forms an 
additional motivational source for moral action, as Damon (1996) suggested, changes in 
adolescents' moral emotion attributions can be reasonably expected. The present study aims at 
investigating such changes by extending the happy-victimizer research paradigm and by 
considering adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions following a moral transgression in the 
broader context of adolescent development. This research examines the extent to which moral 
emotion attributions predict adolescents' delinquent behavior. Moreover, the study investigates 
whether there is an increased consistency of moral emotion attributions and confidence in moral 
judgment as part of the more general developmental dynamic related to the formation of a moral 
self. These issues are further elaborated and more specific hypotheses are formulated below. But 
first, a more general methodological statement on the study's approach to adolescents' moral 
emotion attributions is needed. 
Certainly, any investigation of moral emotion attributions in adolescence requires important 
modifications of the original happy-victimizer research paradigm. It is evident that stories typically 
used in studies with children (e.g. a child pushes another child off a swing because she wants to 
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play and there is only one swing on the playground) would be inappropriate, since scenarios 
describing moral transgressions must be relevant to adolescents. Moreover, as adolescents might be 
more concerned with self-presentation in an interview situation than children, social desirability 
response bias needs to be taken into consideration as a possible confound regarding all moral 
emotion attributions. Most importantly, the response format for emotion attributions needs to be 
modified. Happy-victimizer research with children focuses on the shift in the valence of emotion 
attributions (from 'feeling good' to 'feeling bad'). Studies with children repeatedly demonstrated that 
this shift occurs in childhood. Thus, it is highly probable that virtually all adolescents would 
anticipate bad feelings when committing an immoral action, at least to some extent. However, shifts 
in the valence of emotion attributions are not the only kind of change that may occur in the course 
of development. There might be developmental change in the intensity of self-evaluative emotional 
reactions even if happy-victimizer attributions have disappeard in this age period. The present study 
thus will focus on the intensity of self-evaluative emotional reactions following a moral 
transgression rather than on the shift in the valence of emotion attributions. By focusing on the 
intensity of emotional responses it becomes possible to investigate changes in moral emotion 
attributions in adolescence, even if the happy-victimizer phenomenon as such (good feelings after a 
moral transgression) may have disappeared in this age-period. 
Adolescents' moral emotion attributions and delinquent behavior. Theoretically, the 
intensity of the self-evaluative emotional reactions following a moral transgression is considered as 
an indicator of adolescents' moral motivation strength. Adolescents who anticipate less intense 
negative self-evaluative emotions when committing an immoral action in order achieve a desired 
goal are probably less motivated to abstain from such actions because, in situations where morality 
and self-interest conflict, they experience the reasons for doing what is morally right as less 
important to themselves. As a consequence, these adolescents might be more frequently involved in 
delinquent behavior that is typical for their age (e.g. shop-lifting, minor forms of fraud). This 
hypothesis will be tested empirically. 
Adolescents' moral emotion attributions, confidence in moral judgment and the formation of 
a moral self. Various developmental dimensions contribute to the integration of self and morality 
and to the formation of a moral self in the adolescent years. On the one side, there are changes in 
adolescent self-understanding that make it possible for adolescents to integrate moral ideals into 
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their self-concept (Damon & Hart, 1988). On the other side, there are changes in adolescents' 
metacognitive understanding of human knowledge, in general, and moral knowledge, in particular, 
that facilitate the integration of moral beliefs into more personal belief systems. Evidence for such 
changes in adolescents' metacognitive understanding comes from research on the development of 
epistemic cognition. 
Research on epistemic cognition has provided ample evidence for three main levels that 
represent important milestones in the course of adolescents' epistemic reasoning development (for 
an overview see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kitchener, 2002; Moshman, 2005): In an early period of 
development, knowledge, in general, is understood as a direct copy of external reality. The sole 
source of knowledge is the external world. This conception of knowledge and knowing changes 
markedly once individuals attain the subsequent, multiplistic stance. A multiplist understands 
knowledge as mainly determined by one's personal point of view. Thus, the self is the source of 
knowledge. Finally, these polar extremes of absolutism versus multiplism are brought into a more 
balanced, evaluativist position (Kuhn, Cheney &Weinstock, 2000). On this level, different ideas 
and viewpoints can be evaluated without appealing to ultimate standards of right and wrong. 
Nonetheless, choosing between different viewpoints is not merely considered a matter of personal 
preference because one viewpoint may be preferable on grounds that can be meaningfully debated. 
Research on the development of epistemic cognition demonstrated that, despite considerable 
domain specificity in the timing of developmental transitions, individuals' epistemic reasoning 
follows similar developmental trajectories in different domains of knowledge (Kuhn et al. 2000; 
Hallett, Chandler, & Krettenauer, 2002; Mansfield & Clinchy, 2002). Regarding adolescents' 
epistemic cognition in the moral domain (in the following also referred to as metaethical cognition) 
three developmental levels or stances were identified that are structural analogues of the three main 
levels of epistemic cognition outlined above (these metaethical stances were dubbed: intuitionism, 
subjectivism and transsubjectivism; for further details see Krettenauer (2004) and method section). 
Krettenauer (2004) demonstrated that in the course of adolescent development individuals regularly 
achieve a subjectivist metaethical stance.1 
The development of metaethical subjectivism is probably associated with significant 
changes in adolescents' moral emotion attributions as investigated in the present study: Metaethical 
subjectivists, by definition, consider subjective emotions aroused by the contemplation of a moral 
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problem as an important criterion for moral decision-making. At the prior intuitionist level, in 
contrast, moral judgments are understood analogously to visual perception: one simply "sees" 
whether an action is right or wrong; the rightness or wrongness of an act is thus self-evident. 
Whereas metaethical intuitionists are unable to explicate the source of their moral knowledge, 
subjectivists consider personal feelings as an important source of this knowledge. Thus, along with 
the development of metaethical reasoning the conditions change that need to be satisfied for being 
confident that one's moral judgment is correct: At the intuitionist level confidence depends 
primarily on the demand characteristics of a given situation. If these demand characteristics are 
strong and unambiguous confidence in moral judgment is high. At the subjectivist level (and 
beyond), by contrast, the subjective emotions aroused by the contemplation of a moral problem are 
given more weight than at the prior intuitionist level. As a consequence, the association between the 
intensity of self-attributed moral emotions and confidence in moral judgment may be strengthened 
once adolescents develop a subjectivist metaethical understanding. This hypothesis will be tested 
empirically. 
An increase in the consistency of confidence in moral judgment, on the one hand, and self-
attributed moral emotions, on the other, as postulated in this study, would correspond with the 
general notion of an integration of self and morality in adolescence. At the same time, as should be 
explicitly noted at this point, it would be in full harmony with the well-documented finding that 
individuals regardless of their age consider moral rules as universally binding and independent of 
people's subjective desires (Turiel, 1998; Nucci, 2001). The development of metaethical 
subjectivism that is associated with adolescents' epistemic reasoning is metacognitive (cf. Kuhn, 
1999) and not normative. Thus, even if individuals know that particular actions are wrong because 
of certain non-subjective features of these actions (e.g. their harmfulness), when asked 
epistemological questions about these normative beliefs they may adopt a pure subjectivist position 
and refer to personal feelings as the source of their moral knowledge. Thus, individuals' normative 
judgments and their metaethical position are not necessarily well-coordinated. Kuhn et al. (2000) 
pointed out that such a tension between individuals' thinking about various aspects of the world and 
their epistemological reasoning is pervasive, in particular in adolescence. 
Adolescents' moral emotion attributions and age. Age-related changes in moral emotion 
attributions have been studied only in childhood, so far. While the basic finding that younger 
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children attribute positive emotions to a wrongdoer in spite of knowing that an act is morally wrong 
was replicated many times, considerable disagreement emerged regarding age-related change. Some 
researchers reported strong age-related changes so that the happy victimizer-phenomenon had 
virtually disappeared around the age of 10 years; others provided evidence that many children 
attribute positive emotions to a moral wrongdoer even in late childhood (for an overview see 
Keller, Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003). In three smaller studies, Murgatroyd and Robinson 
compared responses of young adults with responses of older children (Murgatroyd & Robinson, 
1993, Study 4; Murgatroyd & Robinson, 1997, Study 3 and 4). The authors did not find substantial 
differences between the two age groups. This might indicate that there is no general developmental 
change in moral emotion attributions in adolescence. However, as the studies by Murgatroyd and 
Robinson did not compare different age groups of adolescents their studies were not suitable to 
reveal age-related change within this developmental period. In the present study, age-related change 
in the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions are explored. Such an exploration might help to 
clarify the developmental nature of moral emotion attributions that is still controversial in happy-
victimizer research with children. 
In sum, then, the present study is meant to investigate adolescents' self-attributed moral 
emotions when committing an immoral act in the broader context of adolescent development. 
Theoretically, the following two findings are expected: (1) The intensity of self-attributed moral 
emotions following a moral transgression should predict adolescents' engagement in delinquent 
behavior. (2) The association between the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions, on the one 
hand, and confidence in moral judgment, on the other, should increase once adolescents have 
achieved the subjectivist level of metaethical reasoning. In addition to testing these two hypotheses, 
age-related changes in the intensity of adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions are explored. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample of the present study was composed of 200 adolescents equally distributed over 
four different grade levels (Grade 7, 9, 11 and 13) with equal numbers of males and females in each 
age group. Mean ages for the four groups were as follows: 13.14 years (SD = 0.62) for Grade 7; 
15.01 (SD = 0.41) for Grade 9; 17.15 years (SD = 0.54) for Grade 11; and 19.39 (SD = 0.66) for 
Grade 13. The sample was drawn from five different high schools located in socially heterogeneous 
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quarters of East and West Berlin. All adolescents were Caucasian; most of them were born in either 
West- or East-Germany (47% and 43.5%, respectively). The sample was predominantly middle-
class according to Treiman's (1977) Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale, with an 
average occupational status score of parents of M = 49.6 (SD = 11.9, range = 21-78), a score 
reflecting occupations such as nurse or technician. 
Research participants volunteered in response to an advertisement distributed in their 
schools. Each was given an honorarium of 15 EURO. For adolescents younger than 18 years 
informed consent for participating in the study was given by one of the parents. Participants who 
were 18 years old or older had provided informed consent by themselves. 
Measures and Procedures 
In the study participants completed a questionnaire and participated in a semi-structured 
interview of about 45 minutes. The questionnaire was administered in group sessions. The 
interview was conducted individually, audio-recorded and later transcribed. The questionnaire 
assessed social desirability response bias as well as adolescents' engagement in delinquent behavior. 
The interview was designed to assess adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions with regard to 
various moral transgressions as well as their metaethical stance. 
Interview 
In the interview six vignettes were presented that confronted participants with different 
moral problems. Two vignettes described moral dilemmas that were designed to assess adolescents' 
metaethical position. The other four vignettes described moral transgressions similar to those used 
in the happy-victimizer research paradigm. They were used to assess adolescents' self-attributed 
emotions following a moral transgression as well as their confidence in moral judgment. 
Self-attributed moral emotions and confidence in moral judgment. Each of the four vignettes 
that were used to assess adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions described a person committing 
an immoral act in order to satisfy his or her personal interests (for the full text of the scenarios see 
Appendix A). The scenarios described a variety of different moral rule violations. One scenario 
(hereafter referred to as Story I) portrayed a young woman who gave false testimony in a court 
hearing in order to gain a desired job. The second scenario (hereafter referred to as Story II) 
described a man absconding from the scene of a traffic accident because he had been drunk and 
driving. The third scenario described an adolescent not returning a found wallet to the owner (Story 
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III), in the fourth scenario a student was described who stole a desired object from a flea market 
salesman (Story IV). The scenarios were presented in different order (ordering A: Stories I-III-II-
IV; ordering B: Stories II-IV-I-III). Half of the participants (randomly chosen) received version A, 
and the other half version B of the interview. 
After presenting the scenarios, participants were asked to evaluate the protagonist's behavior 
from a moral point of view: Was the person right to do what he or she did? Overall, 192 
participants (96%) consistently considered the described behaviors as morally wrong across all 
scenarios. For these participants negative self-evaluative moral emotions can be reasonably 
expected in the scenarios. This is not true for the other eight respondents who were therefore 
omitted from all further analyses. 
After asking respondents whether what the protagonist did was right, confidence in moral 
judgment were assessed by the additional question "How certain are you that your view is correct?". 
Respondents were asked to provide their answer by choosing between the following response 
categories: 1 = uncertain , 2 = a little uncertain, 3 = a little certain, 4 = certain , 5 = very certain  
and 6 = absolutely certain. Because all four scenarios depicted an obvious immoral action in order 
to obtain a desirable outcome (correspondingly all four actions were almost consensually 
considered wrong by respondents) it is reasonable to sum individuals' responses across scenarios in 
order to enhance the reliability of the study's assessment of confidence in moral judgment. The 
internal consistency of adolescents' responses regarding their confidence in moral judgment across 
the four scenarios was satisfactory, with Cronbach's-a of .63. 
Self-attributed moral emotions were assessed separately for each scenario by the following 
questions: "Imagine you did what ... [name of the protagonist in the story added] ... has done. How 
would you feel afterwards?". Again, respondents had to provide their answers by choosing between 
preformulated response categories. Overall, there were six response categories: 1 = not bad, 2 = a 
little bad, 3 = moderately bad, 4 = bad, 5 = very bad and 6 = extremely bad. These response 
categories reflect the strength of adolescents' self-evaluative moral emotions when committing an 
immoral act. Considering all four scenarios together, a scale analysis indicated satisfactory 
consistency of adolescents' emotion attributions, with a Cronbach's-a of .65. Averaged across the 
four scenarios, the grand mean of adolescents' emotion attributions was M = 4.53 (SD = 0.91), 
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indicating an average intensity of moral emotions between 'bad' and 'very bad'. No effect of story 
order (A vs. B) was found, F(4, 178) = 1.19, p = .317. Across all four scenarios, 12 (out of 192) 
participants had chosen the response category 'not bad' once and four participants opted for this 
response in two scenarios. If this response pattern is taken as an instance of the happy-victimizer 
phenomenon, happy victimizers were thus fairly infrequent in the present sample. 
Metaethical stance. To assess adolescents' metaethical stance, respondents were confronted 
with a moral dilemma and asked what the protagonist should do in the situation. After respondents 
had made a decision, four issues that represent various themes of metaethical reasoning were 
addressed, each by a leading question and further probing (for a detailed description of the 
interview and scoring procedure see also Krettenauer, 2004). Two issues, (a) certainty of moral 
judgment and (b) relativity of moral judgment, reflect beliefs about the nature of moral judgments. 
The other two issues, (c) mechanisms of belief change and (d) sources of decision-making represent 
individuals understanding of the process of moral judgment formation. The interview questions to 
assess metaethical cognition regarding these issues were as follows (translated from German): (a) Is 
there anything regarding your decision that makes you feel uncertain? Why does this make you feel 
uncertain? (certainty); (b) In thinking about your decision, would you say that there is one and only 
one right answer or are there different views regarding the problem which are equally good? Why? 
(relativity); (c) Could you imagine changing your viewpoint? How come that people change their 
view regarding such a problem? (mechanisms of belief change); (d) Imagine that before making a 
decision you had the opportunity to ask somebody else for advice? Whom would you like to ask? 
Why would it be helpful for you to ask this person for advice? (sources of decision-making). There 
were two moral dilemmas. For these two dilemmas the leading questions were posed almost 
identically, with only minor variations in the wording.  
For the four issues more specific scoring criteria were formulated that correspond with the 
general conception of epistemic stances as outlined in the introduction (for an overview of these 
scoring criteria see Appendix B). All four issues were scored separately for each dilemma. The 
scoring procedure yielded eight scores representing respondents' metaethical position across four 
issues and two dilemmas. Individuals were assigned to that metaethical position they had most 
frequently adopted across issues and dilemmas (modal score). On average, 77.3% of interview 
responses across the four issues and two dilemmas reflected respondents' modal score. 
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For the modal score exact interrater agreement between two independent raters in a 
randomly selected subsample of 40 interviews equaled 84.2% with a Cohen's-k of .70. Overall, 
32.3% of participants were classified as intuitionists, 60% of participants were assigned to the 
subjectivist position, whereas only a minority of 7.7% were classified as transsubjectivists. Four 
cases had their modal score on two positions and were therefore not assigned to an overall 
metaethical position. 
Since the differentiation between subjectivism and transsubjectivism as two distinct 
developmental achievements will be left out of consideration in the context of the present study (see 
Footnote 1) only two groups of adolescents will be compared when analyzing the association 
between confidence in moral judgment and intensity of moral emotion attributions: Those who have 
not yet achieved a subjectivist understanding of morality in the course of metaethical development 
versus those who have achieved such an understanding or even transcended it. The first group 
consisted of 63 adolescents with a mean age of 14.62 years, SD = 1.69. This group was significantly 
younger than the second group that included 125 participants of an average age of 17.01 years, SD 
= 2.32, t(186) = 7.24, p < .01. 
Questionnaire 
Delinquent behavior. To assess adolescents' engagement in delinquent behavior a common 
questionnaire procedure was used: Respondents were given a list of various behaviors and asked to 
report whether or not they had engaged in such behavior (response format: 0 = no vs. 1 = yes). Such 
self-report measures of delinquent behavior are generally accepted as a reliable and valid measure 
of juvenile delinquency (Huizinga & Elliot, 1986). Empirical studies documented considerable 
overlap between self-reported delinquency and official data. Patterson and Stouthamer-Loeber 
(1984), for instance, demonstrated that youth who were in contact with the police were almost 
totally a subset of self-report delinquents. Because many offenses do not appear in official records, 
Allen et al. (1997) consider self-report measures as the least biased procedure for the assessment of 
adolescents' problem behavior. In the context of the present study, 12 different kinds of delinquent 
behaviors were presented that are common in adolescence (e.g. shop-lifting, absence from school 
for a whole day without permission, minor forms of fraud and vandalism). The items were 
borrowed from a large-scale representative youth study with German teenagers (Wiesner & 
Silbereisen, 1999). A scale analysis indicated that they can be well aggregated into a single scale 
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with sufficient internal consistency, Cronbach's-a = .73. In the present sample, the grand mean was 
3.52 (SD = 2.62, range = 0-11). Consistent with findings reported by Wiesner and Silbereisen 
(1999), significant effects of gender and age (represented by grade-level) were found, with males 
and older adolescents evidencing higher scores of self-reported delinquent behavior, F(1, 184) = 
18.7 and F(3, 184) = 4.51 respectively, ps < .01. In the sample, 28% of adolescents admitted that 
they had stolen something from a store at least once that was valued at 10 EURO or more. Shop-
lifting was more frequent than crimes that involved any kind of violence and property damage as 
evidenced, for instance, by 21% of adolescents who reported that they had destroyed public 
property at least once just for fun. The most common minimal offense committed by 57% of 
participants was "Trying to get access to a cultural event without paying the entrance fee". 
Social desirability. To control for social desirability as a possible confound of adolescents' 
responses, social desirability response bias was assessed by the German Social Desirability Scale-
17 (SDS-17; Stöber, 1999). The scale was developed as a substitute for the somewhat outdated 
Marlow-Crowne scale. The SDS-17 is particularly suitable for assessing social desirability response 
bias in younger people. It has sufficient reliability and convergent as well as discriminant validity 
(Stöber, 2001). 
Results 
As described in the introduction, the present study focuses on three issues concerning self-
attributed moral emotions in adolescence: (a) the relation between the intensity of self-evaluative 
moral emotions and adolescents' delinquency; (b) the association between self-attributed moral 
emotions and confidence in moral judgment as a function of metaethical stance; (c) the relation 
between self-reported moral emotions and adolescents' age. In the following these questions are 
addressed in turn. Those eight participants who did not share the assumption that all the behaviors 
described in the scenarios were wrong from a moral point of view (see method section) were not 
included in the following analyses. The final sample size therefore was N = 192, with an almost 
equal distribution of participants across genders and grade-levels. If the number of cases deviates 
from 192 in an analysis this is due to missing values. Significance tests will be one-tailed whenever 
the direction of an effect has been postulated. 
Adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions and delinquency. To test the hypothesis that 
self-reported moral emotions following a moral transgression are related to adolescents' delinquent 
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behavior, a hierarchical regression analysis was run. In the first step, social desirability response 
bias was entered in the regression. In the second step, it was tested whether adolescents' self-
reported moral emotions following a moral transgression significantly predict delinquent behavior 
even when social desirability is controlled. In the third step, two different regression models were 
tested, alternatively. Model A included two socio-demographic factors that are usually associated 
with adolescent delinquency, namely gender and age (e.g. Wiesner & Silbereisen, 1999), in order to 
check whether moral emotion attributions contribute to the prediction of adolescents' delinquency 
independent of these factors. Alternatively, Model B tested to what extend the prediction of 
adolescents' delinquent behavior by moral emotion attributions depends on those variables of the 
present study that were postulated to be closely related to moral emotion attributions (confidence in 
moral judgment, metaethical stance as well as the interaction of metaethical subjectivism with 
confidence). Theoretically, it was expected that moral emotion attributions predict adolescent 
delinquency even when these variables are controlled. For the regression analyses adolescents' self-
reported emotional reactions as well as their confidence in moral judgment were averaged across 
the stories and entered as a single scale. Results are summarized in Table 1. 
- Insert Table 1 about here - 
Social desirability was a significant predictor of adolescent delinquency. Nonetheless, 
entering adolescents' moral emotion attributions as assessed in the interview procedure (Step 2) 
yielded a significant increase in the explained variance. Adolescents with stronger self-evaluative 
emotional reactions were less involved in delinquent behavior. Including participants' gender and 
age in the regression (Step 3, Model A) again improved the prediction significantly. Both factors 
were significant predictors, with females as well as younger adolescents evidencing less 
engagement in delinquent behavior. By including participants' gender and age, the effect of moral 
emotions as a predictor of adolescent delinquent behavior was somewhat reduced, but remained 
significant. Thus, the effect of moral emotions as a predictor of delinquent behavior was not 
attributable to adolescents' gender and age. Alternatively, including confidence in moral judgment, 
metaethical stance and the interaction of confidence in moral judgment with metaethical stance as 
controls (Step 3, Model B) did not improve the regression significantly. Moral emotion attributions 
continued to be a significant predictor of delinquent behavior even when these variables were 
controlled.2 
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Adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions and confidence in moral judgment. To 
investigate change in the association between the intensity of moral emotion attributions and 
confidence in moral judgment, participants' interview responses, again, were represented by single 
scales for confidence in moral judgment, on the one hand, and the intensity of self-evaluative moral 
emotions, on the other. For the full sample, the correlation between these two scales was r(190) = 
.53, p < .01. This correlation was slightly reduced when social desirability response bias was 
partialled out, r(189) = .50, p < .01. 
To test the hypothesis that the association between confidence in moral judgment and the 
intensity of moral emotion attributions is moderated by adolescents' metaethical stance, the 
statistical procedure proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) was applied. Thus, two separate 
regressions for the two groups representing different metaethical stances were run with moral 
emotion attributions as dependent variable and confidence in moral judgment as predictor. The 
difference between the unstandardized beta-weights of the two regression equations was then tested 
for significance according to the formula provided by Cohen and Cohen (1983, p. 56).  
For those adolescents who had not yet achieved the subjectivist metaethical position the 
unstandardized beta-weight of confidence in moral judgment as a predictor moral emotion 
attributions was .44, p < .01. By contrast, for those adolescents who had attained the subjectivist 
metaethical position in the course of development or even transcended it, the same regression 
coefficient equaled .74, p < .01. This group difference in the two regression coefficients was 
significant, t = 11.89, df = 184, p < .01. Note, that this finding cannot be attributed to participants' 
chronological age: When the sample was split into two age groups (Grade 7 + 9 versus Grade 11 + 
13) and the regression of moral emotion attributions on confidence in moral judgment was 
computed for the two age groups separately, the two unstandardized beta-weights were of almost 
equal size, with bs = .52 and .53, respectively. Thus, it is metaethical development and not merely 
age that is relevant for the increased consistency of confidence in moral judgment and moral 
emotion attributions in adolescence. 
Adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions and age. To investigate age-related changes in 
the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions a MANOVA was conducted with repeated measures 
on self-reported moral emotions across the four different scenarios as a within-subject factor, 
participants' grade level as a between subject factor and social desirability response bias as a 
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covariate. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 2. Again, there was a significant 
effect of social desirability (b = .27, t = 3.71, p < .01) indicating that adolescents' self-attributed 
moral emotions following a moral transgression are to some extent influenced by social desirability 
response bias. After controlling for this effect, the difference between grade levels was marginally 
significant. Moreover, story content, i.e. the kind of moral transgression that was described in a 
scenario yielded a significant effect with regard to adolescents' emotion attributions. Finally, a 
significant interaction of story content and grade level emerged. 
- Insert Table 2 about here - 
The means of adolescents' self-reported emotional reactions are documented in Table 3. It is 
evident that Story II (absconding from the scene of an accident) evoked the strongest self-
evaluative emotional responses, followed by Story I (giving false testimony). By contrast, 
emotional reactions regarding Story IV (stealing) and Story III (not returning a found wallet) were 
less strong. Averaged across scenarios, participants from Grade 7 tended to report the strongest 
self-evaluative emotional responses and participants from Grade 9 the weakest. From Grade 9 to 
Grade 13 the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions gradually increased. These differences, 
however, need to be interpreted in the broader context of a significant interaction of story content 
and grade level. As demonstrated in Table 3, the intensity of self-attributed moral emotions 
evidenced a U-shaped pattern for Story I (giving false testimony) and Story II (absconding from 
accident), with higher scores in Grade 7, a decrease in Grade 9 and a gradual increase in Grades 11 
and 13. A different pattern was obtained for Story III (not returning found wallet) and Story IV 
(stealing): For these two moral transgressions the strongest negative emotional responses were 
obtained in Grade 7. They then declined so that in Grade 13 adolescents' self-reported negative 
emotional responses following these transgressions were weakest compared to all other grade 
levels. 
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
Discussion 
The present study was meant to investigate adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions 
following a moral transgression in the broader context of adolescent development. Theoretically, it 
was expect that the intensity of self-evaluative emotional reactions when committing an immoral 
act in order to achieve a desired object is a valid indicator of adolescents' moral motivation 
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strength. Results support this view: Self-attributed moral emotions as assessed in the present study 
predicted adolescents' engagement in delinquent behavior even when social desirability response 
bias, gender and age or, alternatively, confidence in moral judgment and metaethical stance were 
statistically controlled. This finding demonstrates that self-reported negative emotional reactions 
following a moral transgression are a valid indicator of individuals' moral motivation strength not 
only in childhood, as indicated by the happy-victimizer research paradigm, but in adolescence as 
well. Thus, studying moral emotions following a moral transgression provides an important bridge 
across the divide that separates moral judgment from moral action. At the same time, the finding 
points at a feature of adolescent delinquency that has not been well documented so far: adolescent 
delinquency apparently is not only characterized by delays in socio-moral development and 
cognitive distortions of antisocial behavior as described, for instance, by Gibbs (1991) as well as 
Gregg, Gibbs and Basinger (1994), but by particular emotional deficiencies, as well. As indicated 
by the findings of the present study, the experience of moral emotions following a moral 
transgression may be an important preventive factor for adolescent delinquency. This functional 
aspect of adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions appears to point to a promising line of further 
research. 
Regarding the association between self-attributed moral emotions, on the one hand, and 
confidence in moral judgment, on the other, it was postulated that these two dimensions become 
more closely associated once adolescents achieve the subjectivist metaethical stance. This 
expectation was fully confirmed. Thus, in the course of adolescent development, the intensity of 
self-evaluative moral emotions becomes an additional source of confidence in one's moral 
judgment. It can either strengthen or weaken a person's moral beliefs. Theoretically, this finding 
supports the more general notion of an integration of self and morality in adolescence as outlined 
by Damon (1996) and Blasi (1995). It demonstrates that the process of coordinating moral 
judgment and moral emotion attributions that starts in childhood, as documented by previous 
happy-victimizer research, continues well into adolescence. At the same time, the finding suggests 
that the close connection between moral certainty and the experience of various moral emotions that 
is characteristic of adults' moral functioning (cf. Montada, 1993) is an outgrowth of individuals' 
metacognitive development. 
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Apart from demonstrating that the strength of self-attributed moral emotions is an important 
factor in adolescent delinquent behavior, and that the development of moral emotion attributions is 
related to changes in underlying metaethical conceptions, the study also provided evidence for age-
related changes in the intensity of adolescents' self-attributed moral emotions. For two moral rule 
violations (giving false testimony and absconding from the scene of an accident) a U-shaped age-
related pattern emerged. By contrast, for the other two moral transgressions (stealing and not 
returning a found wallet) a gradual decrease in the strength of emotional reactions was found. Thus, 
the general age-related trend in moral emotion attributions that was reported repeatedly for children 
(shift from 'feeling good' to 'feeling bad') was not paralleled by a corresponding general increase in 
the intensity of self-evaluative emotional reactions in the adolescent years. Developmental change 
in adolescents' intensity of self-attributed moral emotions turned out to be more complex. Perhaps 
this greater complexity is due to a greater ability of adolescents to take situational variations into 
consideration. However, it also might be the case that similar variations would be found in 
childhood if a broader range of moral issues were included in studies with children and if the focus 
was on the intensity of self-evaluative emotions rather than on the qualitative shift from 'feeling 
good' to 'feeling bad'. Moral emotion attributions in childhood thus may be more context dependent 
than happy-victimizer research generally suggests. This hypothesis needs to be tested by further 
research. 
Because the stories used in the present study do not only describe different types of moral 
rule violations but also vary with regard to the severity of the moral transgression, the contextual 
variations as obtained in the study are somewhat difficult to interpret. They might result from an 
increased coordination of moral judgment, moral emotion attributions and actual behavior as 
indicated by the present study's findings as well as other studies. Leenders and Brugman (in press) 
demonstrated that adolescents consider hypothetical moral transgressions as less immoral and less 
severe than if they actually had committed similar transgressions by themselves. Moral 
transgressions that are considered as less severe by adolescents may become less likely to evoke 
strong moral emotions over the course of development, whereas the contemplation of severe 
transgressions might strengthen self-evaluative emotional reactions. These complex relations 
between the intensity of self-evaluative moral emotions, the severity of moral transgressions, 
adolescents' actual behavior and age needs to be disentangled by future research. 
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Besides the present study's ambiguity concerning the interpretation of age-related changes in 
moral emotion attributions, it should be explicitly noted that the design of this study generally 
might have led to an overestimation of the intensity of moral emotions: Respondents were first 
asked about the moral rightness of the transgression and the confidence in their judgment before 
they were asked how they would feel after committing such a transgression. The demand 
characteristics created by the first two questions may have primed adolescents to use certain 
normative concepts when answering the third question they might not have been accessed 
spontaneously on their own. Although, in the study, no effect of story order was found that would 
indicate a cumulative priming effect, this is a serious limitation of the present study. Because of this 
limitation, the general finding that "happy victimizers" were almost non-existent in the adolescent 
sample needs to be interpreted cautiously. 
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Appendix A 
Scenarios describing moral transgressions (translated from German) 
Story I  (false testimony) 
A young man was accused of robbery and of physically assaulting his victim. There is no proof that 
he is actually guilty. However, there is one witness, Simone. Simone is 18 years old, she has no job 
training and she is unemployed. The father of the suspect promises Simone a job in his company, if 
she willing to exonerate his son. Simone knows that the suspect actually committed the crime. 
Nonetheless, in court she makes a statement that largely exculpates the suspect. - What do you 
think: Was Simone right to do what she did? 
Story II (absconding from accident) 
It is rather late in the evening and Stefan is driving home from a party in his car. He had drunk a lot 
of beer during the party and he is no longer sober. In the darkness, Stefan overlooks a motorbike 
and runs into it. The rider falls off the bike, but does not appear to be severely injured. Stefan is 
afraid of being caught for drinking and driving. He therefore speeds up and drives away. What do 
you think: Was Stefan right to do what he did?  
Story III (not returning found wallet) 
On her way home from school, Jana, a 16-year-old girl, notices a wallet lying on the sidewalk. 
Inside the wallet she finds the identity card of the owner as well as 130 EURO cash. Jana takes the 
money and leaves the wallet lying on the ground. - What do you think: Was Jana right to do what 
she did? 
Story IV (stealing) 
Oliver, a student, has a very unique hobby. He collects old records with original hits from the 50s. 
He already has a considerable collection, but also misses several pieces. One Sunday morning, 
while strolling over the flea market, Oliver finds an album, he had been searching for a long time. 
The salesman, however, wants 50 EURO for the album - a price Oliver cannot afford. At the right 
moment, Oliver takes the album and disappears in the crowd. - What do you think: Was Oliver 
right to do what he did? 
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Appendix B. 
Summary of Metaethical Stances as Defined across Various Issues of Metaethical Cognition 
 Certainty of moral judgment Relativity of moral judgment Mechanisms of belief change Sources of decision-making 
Intuitionism certainty depends on exernal 
circumstances (e.g. 
predictability of consequences 
of a decision) 
a moral judgment is either 
right or wrong; in general, 
there is one single right 
answer to a moral problem 
moral belief change is 
induced by external factors 
(e.g. persuasion) or otherwise 
unexplicable 
experts and authorities 
guarantee correctness of 
decisions 
Subjectivism certainty depends on the degree 
of subjective ambivalence and 
indecision 
a moral judgment is neither 
right nor wrong, but reflects 
mere subjective opinion; 
anything goes 
moral beliefs change by 
putting oneself in the shoes of 
others and taking a different 
personal stance 
the perspective of those 
directly concerned by a 
decision is most important  
Transsubjectivism certainty depends on the 
possibility to justify one's own 
judgment in the face of 
conflicting moral claims 
moral judgments are 
considered as more or less 
well-founded; some answers 
might be better justified than 
others 
beliefs change by readjusting 
the underlying evaluative 
perspective, that combines 
personal commitment with 
the need for justification; the 
process judgment formation 
is in principle open ended 
the perspective that appears 
to be most comprehensive 
and that best balances 
conflicting moral claims is 
decisive 
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Footnotes 
 1 The transsubjectivist metaethical stance, by contrast, is not achieved very often in 
adolescence. Theoretically, the transition from subjectivism to transsubjectivism is not 
considered particularly relevant for the process of integrating self and morality. It is therefore 
left out of consideration in the context of the present study. 
2 Because scores of self-reported delinquent behavior are generally not normally 
distributed (as was the case in the context of the present study), the regression analysis was 
run also with normalized scores of delinquent behavior as the dependent variable. The 
findings did not change due to the variable transformation. 
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Table 1. Summary of Regression Analysis Predicting Delinquent Behavior 
Predictors/Controls b t ∆R2 
Step 1   .16a 
Social Desirability - .39 - 5.96 **  
Step 2    
Social Desirability - .32 - 4.83 ** .04b 
Self-Attributed Moral Emotions - .22 - 3.23 **  
Step 3 (Model A)    
Social Desirability - .32 - 5.01 ** .08c 
Self-Attributed Moral Emotions - .12 - 1.66 *  
Gender (0 = male/1 = female) - .23 - 3.48 **  
Age - .21 3.31 **  
Step 3 (Model B)    
Social Desirability - .33 - 4.93 ** .02d 
Self-Attributed Moral Emotions - .23 - 3.02 **  
Confidence in moral judgment - .25 - 2.09 *  
Metaethical stance (0 = intuitionist; 
1 = subjectivist (and beyond)) 
.66 1.56  
Confidence in moral judgment by 
metaethical stance 
- .72 - 1.61  
a F(1, 190) = 35.57, p < .01 
b ∆F(1, 189) = 10.43, p < .01 
c ∆F(2, 187) = 11.05, p < .01 
d ∆F(3, 182) = 1.47, p = .22 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Table 2 
MANOVA of Self-Attributed Moral Emotions by Adolescents' Grade Level and Story 
 
Factors/Covariates df F p 
Between subjects 
Grade level 3 2.52 .06 
Social desirability 1 13.79 .00 
 Error 178 (2.97)  
Within subjects 
Story 3 50.48 .00 
Story by Grade level 9 3.90 .00 
 Error 537 (1.13)  
    
Note. Numbers in parentheses represent mean square errors. 
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Table 3 
Means of the Intensity of Self-Attributed Moral Emotions by Grade level and Story 
 
 Grade  
Story (content) 7 9 11 13 Total 
I (false testimony) 4.81 (1.36) 4.19 (1.42) 4.24 (1.30) 4.58 (1.12) 4.45 (1.33) 
II (absconding from accident) 5.29 (0.72) 5.17 (1.09) 5.33 (0.87) 5.37 (0.85) 5.29 (0.89) 
III (not returning found wallet) 4.26 (1.52) 3.98 (1.44) 4.17 (1.45) 3.69 (1.39) 4.03 (1.46) 
IV (stealing) 5.11 (1.27) 4.15 (1.46) 3.85 (1.46) 3.77 (1.51) 4.23 (1.48) 
Total  4.89 (0.84) 4.37 (0.92) 4.41 (0.81) 4.46 (0.99) 4.53 (0.91) 
 
Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard-deviations. 
 
